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UNITED STATES V. JARRETT
(decided July 29, 2003)
ANDRES A. MUÑOZ*
Hackers1 are routinely portrayed as super-criminals with ex-
traordinary powers who roam the internet in search of valuable in-
formation contained within a person’s or a company’s computers.2
But, what happens when a hacker stumbles across information that
may incriminate its owner?  How does the law define when the gov-
ernment is able to use information that a hacker has decided to
turn over to law enforcement?  Until recently, courts have not faced
such questions; however, with the proliferation of the Internet and
computer networks, courts now face the challenge of applying con-
ventional law to cutting-edge technological issues.3
In United States v. Jarrett, the Fourth Circuit faced one such
challenge.4  In Jarrett, the issue was whether the prosecution could
use information obtained from a private hacker’s search of the de-
fendant’s personal computer.  The court, in analyzing the issue of
suppression, looked at whether an agency relationship existed be-
tween the government and the hacker and applied a traditional
two-part agency relationship test to an ultra-modern problem to
produce a flawed result.  Instead of requiring that the government
actively acquiesce in a search to establish the agency relationship,
the court should have only looked to see if there was passive acqui-
* J.D. Candidate 2005, New York Law School.
1. In this context, a hacker is defined as “One who uses programming skills to
gain illegal access to a computer network or file.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 545 (4th ed. 2000).
2. Michael Lee et al., Comment, Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for
Legitimacy: A Regulatory Proposal, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 839, 845 (1999).
3. See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (recog-
nizing that courts have struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology
within the confines of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act); see also Michelle R.
Jackson-Carter, Note and Comment, International Shoe and Cyberspace: The Shoe Doesn’t Fit
When It Comes to the Intricacies and Nuances of Cyberworld, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 217 (1998)
(quoting Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness
in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 339, 342 (1996)) (acknowl-
edging that courts have been struggling with jurisdictional issues in cyber-actions).
4. United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2003).
411
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escence.  Such a strict standard is needed to adequately protect a
person’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures when dealing with hackers who turn over incriminat-
ing information to the government.
On July 16, 2000, a computer hacker, known as Unknownuser,
contacted the Alabama Police Department with information regard-
ing a Dr. Bradley Steiger.5  Unknownuser, a citizen and resident of
Istanbul, Turkey, hacked into Steiger’s computer and found evi-
dence of child pornography.6  Unknownuser sent Captain Kevin
Murphy of the Alabama Police Department an unsolicited email
containing several of the images he found along with a text message
in which Unknownuser explained that he had Steiger’s personal
information and additional pictures.7  He then inquired whether
he should send the information to the same email address.8  Mur-
phy’s reply email stated, “Please feel free to send the information
that you have.  We will do everything we can.”9  After a series of
emails, Unknownuser subsequently provided Murphy with Steiger’s
personal information, which was forwarded to FBI Agent Margaret
Faulkner, who had a fixed working relationship with the Alabama
Police Department regarding internet child pornography cases.10
Using this information, the FBI identified and arrested Steiger and
a jury convicted him of violating various federal statutes.11  Steiger
was sentenced to 171/2 years imprisonment.12  After the conviction,
an FBI agent named Duffy, sent Unknownuser an email expressing
his gratitude and saying that Unknownuser would not be prose-
cuted for hacking because, as a foreigner, he was not subject to U.S.




9. Id. at 506.
10. Id. at 505.
11. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 341.
12. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003).
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laws.13  The email also specified, “If you want to bring other infor-
mation forward, I am available.”14
A year after Agent Duffy’s email, Unknownuser contacted Cap-
tain Murphy with information regarding another suspected child
pornographer, William Jarrett.15  Again, Unknownuser used hack-
ing as the method to obtain information from Jarrett’s personal
computer.16  Murphy instructed Unknownuser to send all informa-
tion to Murphy’s email address so that he could forward it to the
FBI.17  Through a total of thirteen emails, “including a ten-part se-
ries of emails with a total of 45 attached files,” Unknownuser pro-
vided the FBI with all the evidence of child pornography and
personal information necessary to produce an arrest.18  After the
arrest, Agent Faulkner sent Unknownuser an email thanking him
for his assistance and then “engaged in what can only be character-
ized as the proverbial wink and a nod.”19  For the next two months,
Unknownuser engaged in “pen-pal type correspondence” with
Agent Faulkner.20  In these emails, Faulkner expressed gratitude
and admiration for Unknownuser and assured him that he would
not be a target of law enforcement for his hacking activities.21  Ad-
ditionally, Unknownuser spoke freely of his hacking adventures and
suggested in no uncertain terms that he would continue to search
for child pornographers using the same methods employed to iden-
tify Steiger and Jarrett.22
13. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 509.  This e-mail was also part of an unsuccessful FBI
attempt to identify Unknownuser.  FBI Agents Duffy and Faulkner, through the use of
telephone calls and e-mails, encouraged Unknownuser to identify himself and possibly
testify at Steiger’s trial.  Both agents repeatedly promised Unknownuser that he would
not be arrested. Id.
14. Id.
15. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 341-42.
16. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
17. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 342.
18. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 510.
19. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 343. This proverbial wink and a nod consisted of the follow-
ing statement: “I cannot ask you to search out cases such as the ones you have sent us
. . . but if you should happen across such pictures as the ones you have sent us and wish
us to look into the matter, please feel free to send them to us . . .  We also have no




\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 4  8-DEC-04 14:15
414 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
Three weeks after Jarrett’s arrest, a grand jury indicted him on
one count of manufacturing child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 2251(a) and seven counts of receiving child pornogra-
phy in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(a)(2)(A).23 Jarrett moved to
suppress the evidence obtained through the execution of the
search warrant on the ground that the government violated his
Fourth Amendment rights in using the information provided by
Unknownuser to secure the search warrant.24 The district court de-
nied the motion and Jarrett then entered a conditional guilty plea
to a one-count criminal indictment charging him with manufactur-
ing child pornography.25 Prior to sentencing, however, Jarrett
moved to reconsider his earlier motion to suppress on the basis of
new evidence — the post-arrest series of emails exchanged between
Unknownuser and Agent Faulkner.26  The government did not dis-
close these emails until after Jarrett had entered his guilty plea.27
The district court, after reviewing the series of emails between
Unknownuser and FBI agents, concluded that an agency relation-
ship had been established between the hacker and the government
and that the government knew of and acquiesced in the searches
conducted by Unknownuser and granted the defendant’s motion to
suppress the evidence.28
The district court began its legal analysis by reviewing the rele-
vant case law and stated that there are particular factors, such as
government knowledge, government presence during a search, and
the government’s failure to prevent a search, that, when standing
alone, fail to establish the requisite agency relationship.29  When
looking at the case at bar, however the court held that there are
many “individual factors in combination which, when viewed in
their totality, show that the government and Unknownuser ex-
pressed their consent to an agency relationship.”30  While
Unknownuser may have acted without government suggestion in
23. Id. at 342.
24. Id.
25. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 342.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 343.
29. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 518-19.
30. Id. at 519.
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the Steiger case, the same was not true for the search of Jarrett’s
computer.31  The Duffy communications, the district court held,
contained significant encouragement from law enforcement of-
ficers, specific requests to further assist the police with the investiga-
tion of Steiger, assurances that the information Unknownuser
revealed was valuable to law enforcement and had helped save lives,
requests to maintain future contact with law enforcement officers,
and assurances that Unknownuser would not be prosecuted.32
Therefore, the Duffy communications clearly showed that
Unknownuser had established an agency relationship with the gov-
ernment after the Steiger matter; by the time Unknownuser was
hacking into Jarrett’s computer, there was far more than knowledge
on the government’s part.33  As for the post-arrest Faulkner com-
munications, the district court stated that “although the statements
were made after Jarrett’s arrest, they helped clarify the relationship
between the government and Unknownuser.”34  The district court
concluded that the government knew of and acquiesced in the Jar-
rett search and that Unknownuser’s actions were motivated solely
by an interest to further law enforcement efforts.35  Thus, Jarrett’s
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.36
The Fourth Circuit reversed.37  Writing for the court, Justice
Motz reviewed the facts surrounding the Steiger case as well as the
Jarrett case before stating that, in considering the suppression rul-
ing, the court would review the district court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal determinations de novo.38  The court held
that although the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures by government officials and those private
individuals acting as agents of the government, it does not afford
any protections when those searches are conducted by a private
31. Id. at 518-19.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 514.
35. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
36. Id. at 519-20.
37. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 348.
38. Id. at 343-44.
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party.39  Any such private wrongdoing does not deprive the govern-
ment of the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully.40
To determine if an agency relationship exists, the court held
one must look at the facts and circumstances surrounding each case
and determine the degree of the government’s participation in the
private party’s activities.41  Such a determination involves looking at
two primary factors:  (1) whether the government knew of and ac-
quiesced in the private search; and (2) whether the private individ-
ual intended to assist law enforcement or had some other
independent motivation.42  The court acknowledged that in prior
decisions the Fourth Circuit had compressed this two-part test into
“one highly pertinent consideration.”43  When determining
whether the government acquiesced, the court stated that there
must be some evidence of government participation either through
initiating or instigating the private action; mere knowledge and pas-
sive acquiescence is not enough.44  Here, the government con-
ceded the existence of the second primary factor — that
Unknownuser’s motives stemmed from his interest in assisting law
enforcement.45  Thus, the court looked solely at whether the Gov-
ernment knew of and acquiesced in Unknownuser’s search in a
manner sufficient to transform Unknownuser into an agent of the
government, and so render the search unconstitutional.46
The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in relying
on the Unknownuser/Agent Faulkner exchanges to find that the
government knew of and acquiesced in the Jarrett search.47  While
the emails between Unknownuser and Agent Faulkner established
an ongoing relationship sufficient to make Unknownuser an agent
39. Id. at 344.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 348.
43. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 345.  This “one highly pertinent consideration is ‘whether
the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct and whether the pri-
vate party’s purpose for conducting the search was to assist law enforcement efforts and
further her own ends.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739 (7th Cir.
1987)).
44. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 345.
45. Id. at 345.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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of the government, the email exchanges “took place after
Unknownuser had hacked into Jarrett’s computer, after the fruits
of Unknownuser’s hacking had been made available to the FBI, af-
ter Jarrett’s home and computer had been searched, and after Jar-
rett himself had been arrested.”48  Thus, the government’s
knowledge and acquiescence was entirely post-search and was irrel-
evant.49  As for the emails between Unknownuser and Agent Duffy
regarding the Steiger case, the court concluded that they were noth-
ing more than “perfunctory expressions of gratitude for Unknown-
user’s assistance, assurances that Unknownuser would not be
prosecuted, and a vague offer of availability to receive more infor-
mation in the future.”50  The court then concluded by stating that
without more evidence, these exchanges were not enough to create
an agency relationship that would include the Jarrett search.51 If
the Duffy communications created such an agency relationship,
“virtually any government expression of gratitude for assistance well
prior to an investigation would effectively transform any subsequent
search by the party into a government search.”52
One important lesson thus emerges from Jarrett: so long as the
government does not explicitly request hackers to search, hackers
have the green light to search a person’s computer for incriminat-
ing information and transmit it to law enforcement.  This leads to
the rather disturbing conclusion that only in the most blatant in-
stances of government participation in an investigation will evi-
dence obtained from a hacker be suppressed.  Such a standard fails
to take into account the unique nature of hacking.
Critical to both the court of appeals’ and the district court’s
analysis was the degree of the government’s acquiescence in the
Jarrett search.  Both courts, relying on well-settled precedent,53
held that acquiescence requires some degree of active participa-
tion; mere passive acquiescence is insufficient to produce a Fourth
48. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 345.




53. See United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that acqui-
escence requires some degree of active government participation); United States v.
Koenig, 856 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788
(9th Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1996) (same).
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Amendment violation.54  In support of this proposition, the court
of appeals stated, “it is only by the exercise of some form of control
that the actions of one may be attributed to another.”55 “Mere
knowledge of another’s independent action does not produce vica-
rious responsibility absent some manifestation of consent or the
ability to control,” and it is only with active encouragement that this
control is created.56  By narrowly limiting the standard of acquies-
cence needed to produce a Fourth Amendment violation, courts
are presumably concerned with limiting government liability in
search and seizure cases.  But in cases such as the one at issue,
where a hacker is free to search a person’s computer in hopes of
finding incriminating information, does this standard provide suffi-
cient Fourth Amendment protection?
As in Jarrett, significant Fourth Amendment issues arise once a
hacker decides to turn over any incriminating information to law
enforcement.  The key inquiry here is whether an agency relation-
ship existed between the hacker and law enforcement.  As men-
tioned above, well-settled case law requires active encouragement
on the part of the government to establish an agency relationship
for search and seizure issues. But as one commentator puts it,
“[w]hen the ability to search without burden increases, does the
government’s power to search increase as well?”57  “Or, ‘[i]s free-
dom inversely related to the efficiency of the available means of
surveillance?  If so, we have much to fear.’”58
In the context of hacking, the requirement that a party exer-
cise active acquiescence to establish an agency relationship does not
afford adequate Fourth Amendment protection.  The nature of a
hacker’s computer search is different than the nature of search
methods typically addressed under relevant precedent.59  The
54. Although both courts ultimately differed in their conclusion, the standard of
acquiescence was the same.
55. Jarrett, 338 F.3d at 345 (quoting United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 850
(7th Cir. 1988)).
56. Id.
57. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 18 (1999).
58. Id. (quoting JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 4 (1996)).
59. See Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier,
11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 85 (2001) (stating that unlike traditional crimes, hacking
is prosecuted less because of several interrelated factors, including the problem of ano-
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search is distinctive because it occurs in virtual space rather than in
real space.  This distinction is important for several reasons.  First, a
search in virtual space requires little skill and effort.60  While hack-
ing once required a large amount of computer expertise, today rel-
atively little computer skill is needed to hack.61  The modern
recreational hacker can easily search various websites for “detailed
instructions on hacking techniques and downloadable, do-it-your-
self hacking tools.”62  As a matter of fact, Unknownuser ran across
hacking software while looking for other programs on the Internet
and stated that he found Dr. Steiger’s information the first time he
used the software.63  In an email he wrote to law enforcement in the
Steiger case, Unknownuser stated that he was not a “computer
freak;” rather, he was a thirty-three-year-old professional who
hacked for a hobby.64  Additionally, because of the nature of cyber-
space, hackers are able to search quickly and efficiently.65  For in-
stance, Unknownuser told FBI Agent Duffy about his ability to
search thousands of computers with relative ease.66  Most impor-
tantly, hackers have the ability to remain anonymous.67  Thus, the
government has trouble locating hackers and, as a consequence,
cannot prosecute them.  Moreover, foreign hackers are not subject
to U.S. laws and the U.S. may not make a foreign country prose-
nymity, jurisdictional issues, and the lack of resources in the law enforcement
community).
60. See Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? An Economic
Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 176 (2000) (stating that to-
day’s hackers come from many walks of life including juveniles with little computer
knowledge who easily obtain effective hacking tools on the Internet).
61. See id. See also Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Ap-
proach to the Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 185 (2000) (stating that while hacking once required a fair
amount of skill or computer knowledge, the recreational hacker today can now
download attack scripts and protocols from the Internet and launch them against vic-
tim sites with little knowledge of the systems they are attacking).
62. Calkins, supra note 60, at 176.
63. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
64. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1043 (11th Cir. 2003).
65. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Old Crimes in New Battles: Sanctioning Cyber Crimes,
9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237 (discussing the increased efficiency that computers provide
to a criminal enterprise).
66. Jarrett, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
67. Elizabeth Reiter, The Department of Defense DNA Repository: Practical Analysis of the
Government’s Interest and the Potential for Genetic Discrimination, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 975, 1018
(1999).
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cute, especially if cyber-crime laws do not exist in that country.68  As
in Jarrett, this anonymity and invulnerability from prosecution cre-
ates an unintentional grant of immunity from prosecution.69  This
is dangerous because once a hacker commences a search of a per-
sonal computer, all information is available; whether it is incrimi-
nating or not.70  So while hackers may be searching for
incriminating evidence, they may also be searching for personal
and financial information without fear of prosecution.  Lastly, com-
puter crimes often tend to be marginalized.71  The reason for this
may be that the injuries and stigmas associated with cyber-crimes
are not seen as serious as the injuries, mens rea, and stigmas associ-
ated with crimes in real space.72  This marginalization leads to a
different perception and treatment of cyber-crimes.  An act that
would be blatantly unacceptable in real space may have its virtual
counterpart become less objectionable because no significant injury
is sustained.  If the scenario changed to one where private individu-
als made it a habit to illegally search people’s homes for incriminat-
ing evidence to subsequently hand over to law enforcement, then
the public might demand a change in the law.  However, this scena-
rio is improbable.  Searching homes requires significant effort, and
as the number of homes searched increases, the likelier it is for a
person to be caught.73  Thus, the traditional agency requirement of
active acquiescence is suitable in real space but problematic when
applied to cyberspace.
68. Daniel M. Creekman, Note and Comment, A Helpless America? An Examination
of the Legal Options Available to the United States in Response to Varying Types of Cyber-Attacks
from China, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 641, 657-62 (2002).
69. This immunity puts the government in the position of implicitly encouraging
a hacker’s illegal behavior.
70. See Mark J. Maier, Backdoor Liability from Internet Telecommuters, 6 COMP. L. REV.
& TECH. J. 27, 33 (2001) (explaining how hackers use “Trojan Horse” programs to gain
complete access to a computer).
71. See Terri A. Cutrera, Note, The Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental Rights
of Computer Users, 60 UMKC L. REV. 139, 141 (1991) (explaining how law enforcement
had for years marginalized computer crimes).
72. See generally Catherine Therese Clarke, From Criminet to Cyber-Perp: Toward an
Inclusive Approach to Policing the Evolving Criminal Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV.
191 (1996).
73. David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders,
110 YALE L. J. 733, 750-53 (2001) (explaining that over the long run the probability
increases for repeat offenders to be caught).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-1\NLR106.txt unknown Seq: 11  8-DEC-04 14:15
2004] UNITED STATES V. JARRETT 421
To afford adequate Fourth Amendment protection from hack-
ing, the two-part test for an agency relationship in Internet search
and seizure cases should replace the active acquiescence element
with passive acquiescence.74  With a passive acquiescence require-
ment, the court’s two-part test for an agency relationship would
consist of the following two inquiries: (1) whether the individual
acted with motives to help law enforcement75; and (2) whether the
government knew of and passively acquiesced in the search.  Part
two of the test is satisfied if the government has knowledge that an
individual provided the government with information by hacking
on prior occasions and the government has used the information in
a criminal investigation.76  In Jarrett then, for example, the acquies-
cence element of the agency test would be satisfied because the gov-
ernment knew that Unknownuser transmitted information
obtained through hacking to the government on prior occasions
and that he intended to continue the same type of activity.  Such a
strict test is the best way to give a person adequate protection from
hackers turning over personal information to the government in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
While it may be argued that an active acquiescence standard is
necessary because it allows the government to prosecute individuals
who otherwise could not be prosecuted, Fourth Amendment rights
should be of paramount concern.  Some commentators have ar-
gued that use of private hackers may be necessary to compensate
for law enforcement’s inadequacies in technical sophistication and
74. This would not be the first time courts have interpreted acquiescence to be
passive.  In Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003), the court, in inter-
preting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7) (Implementation of the Convention Against Torture),
defined acquiescence to require only “awareness” and not to require “actual knowl-
edge” or “willful acceptance.”
75. This part of the agency relationship test remains unchanged.
76. Such a test is in accord with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 43(2)
(1958) (stating “acquiescence by the principal in a series of acts by the agent indicates
authorization to perform similar acts in the future”).  The comments shed further light
on this section: “Approval of a single authorized act does not, of itself, justify an infer-
ence of authority to repeat it.  On the other hand, if the agent performs a series of acts
of a similar nature, the failure of the principal to object to them is an indication that he
consents to the performance of similar acts in the future under similar conditions.
These inferences can be rebutted, however, and it can be shown that the agent was not
authorized.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 43(2), cmt. b (1958).
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experience.77  However, this should not be an excuse to blatantly
disregard a person’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.  The current agency standard allows a
private hacker to continually send incriminating information to the
government for the purpose of prosecuting others so long as active
solicitations are not made.  As seen in Jarrett, the nature of cyber-
space allows hackers to remain anonymous and avoid prosecution
while continuing to illegally search computers.  This enables the
government to use illegally obtained incriminating information
from the same hacker countless times in violation of the very es-
sence of the Fourth Amendment.78  A requirement of passive acqui-
escence would effectively curb the government from crossing the
line into the realm of unconstitutionality in order to prosecute de-
fendants that the government itself has trouble policing.
In Jarrett, the court essentially used an old law approach inade-
quately designed to deal with modern issues.  In turn, the court
produced a disquieting result. Hacking differs from traditional
types of searches because it is anonymous, requires little skill and
time, the tools are easily obtained, and the scope of the search is
extensive.  A person is entitled to a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in his or her computer files79 and when technology allows pri-
vate individuals to illegally search computers and establish
relationships with law enforcement with almost no burden, judicial
interpretations of agency and search and seizure laws must adapt.
The court here has failed to do that.  It is troubling to think that
with this result, as long as no active solicitations are made, the gov-
ernment can establish relationships with known private hackers
through suggestive thank you notes, and repeatedly accept informa-
tion for purposes of prosecution.  Moreover, because most hackers
remain anonymous they obtain an unintentional immunity from
the government for their activities and are unaccountable for their
77. See William R. Graham, Jr., Comment, Uncovering and Eliminating Child Pornog-
raphy Rings on the Internet:  Issues Regarding and Avenues Facilitating Law Enforcement’s Ac-
cess to ‘Wonderland’, 2000 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 457 (2000).
78. The essence of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasion by governmental officials by imposing a stan-
dard of reasonableness upon the exercise of those officials’ discretion. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
79. See Trulock v. Freehe, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that a person is
entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in password protected computer files).
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actions.  This provides no incentive to stop illegal behavior and, at
the very least, promotes cyber-vigilantism.  Unknownuser’s actions
would not be tolerated in real space and there is no reason why
they should be allowed in cyberspace.  Thus, in cases with facts simi-
lar to Jarrett’s, courts should replace the active acquiescence ele-
ment in the agency test with an element of passive acquiescence.  It
is only through this new strict standard that a person’s Fourth
Amendment rights can be adequately safeguarded.
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